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FROM SCARCITY TO ABUNDANCE: THE
CHANGING DYNAMICS OF ENERGY
CONFLICT
Michael T. Klare*

INTRODUCTION
In November 2012, the International Energy Agency (IEA)
triggered headlines around the world when it announced that the
United States, by dint of its success in utilizing new extractive
technologies, would likely overtake Saudi Arabia to become the
world’s leading oil producer by 2020.1 At a time in which many
analysts had come to believe that the world was facing an impending
“peak” in global oil output followed by an irreversible decline,2 the
IEA’s report was said to herald a new and unexpected era of
hydrocarbon plenty. In commenting on the report, many analysts
spoke in particular about the purported economic benefits of energy
abundance, notably the prospect of new jobs and manufacturing
activities.3 As the IEA indicated, however, the new energy bounty
* Michael T. Klare, Five College Professor of Peace and World Security
Studies, and director of the Five College Program in Peace and World Security
Studies (PAWSS) at Hampshire College.
1 International Energy Agency (IEA), WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012
52, 157 (2012),
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2012_free.pd
f.
2 See, e.g., KENNETH S. DEFFEYES, HUBBERT’S PEAK: THE IMPENDING
WORLD OIL SHORTAGE (2001); Robert L. Hirsch, The Inevitable Peaking of World Oil
Production, 26 BULL. ATL. COUNCIL U.S. 1-9 (Oct. 2005).
3 See,
e.g., Saudi America, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2012,
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873238947045781145911744
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has political and military implications. “This energy renaissance,” it
declared, “has far-reaching consequences for energy markets, trade,
and, potentially, even for energy security, geopolitics, and the global
economy.”4
Energy security and geopolitics have, of course, played a
pivotal role in international affairs for a very long time, ever since the
development of oil-powered vehicles and weapons of war. As the
demand for petroleum exploded, especially in the years during and
after World War I, the major military and industrial powers fought
with one another for control over the world’s handful of oilproducing areas. Gaining access to foreign oil supplies was also a
major war aim of Germany and Japan during World II and a major
concern of the United States during the Cold War era. After the
Cold War, the United States continued to place a high priority on
ensuring its access to foreign oil supplies, employing military force on
several occasions to protect the oil flow from the Persian Gulf.5 The
2012 IEA statement suggested, however, that the well-established
relationship between energy and geopolitics would be profoundly
altered as a result of the current “energy renaissance.”
As an energy-specific organization, the IEA did not offer its
own prognosis on the geopolitical implications of its suggestive
comment, except to note that we should expect a shift in the center
of gravity of world oil and natural gas production from the Middle
East to North America.6 Nevertheless, it is obvious from its analysis
that this shift and other consequences of the “renaissance” will have
profound implications for the foreign and security policies of both
energy importing and exporting nations and for the prospects for
53074; Ed Crooks, U.S. Shale Gas Sparks a Chemical Revolution, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2012,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d1a183d2-40a3-11e2-aafa00144feabdc0.html#axzz3B4D6zQZy; Jim Motavalli, Natural Gas Signals a
‘Manufacturing
Renaissance,’
N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
10,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/11/business/energy-environment/wideravailability-expands-uses-for-natural-gas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
4 IEA, supra note 1, at 74.
5 See generally MICHAEL T. KLARE, BLOOD AND OIL 26-55 (2004).
6 WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 1, at 74-80.
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conflict over oil and gas. In particular, policies aimed at securing the
safe flow of oil from the Middle East to markets in the West—a
source of repeated crisis and conflict in the past—are now being
called into question, while disputes over new sources of energy, such
as those in offshore areas and the Arctic, have gained fresh attention.
More importantly, the very basis for energy-driven security policies—
an expectation of perpetually inadequate supplies of hydrocarbons—
appears to have been rendered invalid by the dramatic rise in global
output, raising doubts about the future likelihood of wars over oil.7
Will conflict over energy supplies disappear in an era of oil
and gas abundance? Or will it take new forms, governed by the
changing geography of global supply and demand? Although it is still
too early to provide a definitive answer to these questions, it is
possible to detect several significant trends in energy geopolitics—all
suggesting that the risk of conflict over oil and natural gas supplies
will not disappear in an era of hydrocarbon abundance. This essay
will trace the origins of energy geopolitics and attempt to show how
it is being affected by the development of new production
technologies.
I. THE GEOPOLITICS OF SCARCITY
The relationship between oil and geopolitics first arose during
World War I when oil-powered weapons—tanks, planes, and
submarines—first made their appearance on the battlefield and the
major powers scoured the world for reliable sources of supply. With
reserves limited and only a few major deposits then in production—
mostly in the United States, Romania, Iran (then Persia), and Baku in
the Czarist empire—the principal belligerents sought to control these

7 See generally Ed Crooks & Geoff Dyer, Energy Security: Strength in Reserve,
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/916a6744-0f14-11e38e58-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3BMCFD8uY; Daniel Yergin, America’s New Energy
Security,
WALL
S T.
J.,
Dec.
12,
2011,
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240529702044498045770689320269
51376.
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areas or deny their opponents access to them. After the war, the
surviving great powers engaged in a competitive struggle to extend
their sway in the major oil-producing areas, especially in the Persian
Gulf area and the Caucasus.8
Many scholars believe that it was Winston Churchill who first
grasped the geopolitical significance of oil and its association with the
Persian Gulf. In 1912, as First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill
ordered the conversion of British warships from coal to oil
propulsion in the belief that this would give them an advantage over
Germany’s coal-powered ships in the event of war.9 Because Great
Britain at that time did not possess domestic oil reserves of its own
(the North Sea fields were not discovered until much later), Churchill
determined that London must obtain a secure overseas source of oil
under direct British authority. The most propitious option, he
concluded, was to impose government control over the AngloPersian Oil Company (APOC, the forerunner of British Petroleum),
which had secured a concession to promising reserves in
southwestern Persia. As a result of his prodding, Parliament voted in
1914 to nationalize APOC and bring its Persian concession under
London’s control. From that point onward, the protection of
APOC’s concession area, and of British supply lines to the Persian
Gulf (especially the Suez Canal), were viewed as matters of vital
national security by the British government.10
The strategic aspect of the international competition for oil
reserves continued to play a significant role in international relations
after World War I and in the years leading up to the Second World
War. The major European powers, possessing few domestic oil
reserves of their own, focused much of their efforts on acquiring a
foothold in the oil-bearing regions of the Middle East. This was the
era of the San Remo Agreement of 1920, under which Britain
obtained control over Iraq through a mandate from the League of
8 See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY
& POWER 184-206 (2001) [hereinafter THE PRIZE].
9 See generally GEOFFREY JONES, THE STATE AND THE EMERGENCE OF
THE BRITISH OIL INDUSTRY 9–31 (1981).
10 Id. at 129–76; see also THE PRIZE, supra note 8, at 153–64.
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Nations.11 Meanwhile, Japan—a rising industrial power with a similar
paucity of oil—harbored imperial ambitions over the Dutch East
Indies, then the major producer in Asia.
The need to secure overseas sources of oil played a significant
role in the strategic planning of Germany and Japan, both of which
sought to invade and conquer foreign producing areas in order to
fuel their military forces and industrial systems. In 1941, when fullscale combat broke out, both undertook military strikes with this
purpose in mind: Germany invaded the Soviet Union, with Baku as
one of its primary objectives; Japan invaded the Dutch East Indies.
With Washington becoming increasingly alarmed by Japan’s
aggressive moves in Asia, Japanese leaders concluded that its invasion
of the Dutch East Indies would provoke a U.S. military response of
some sort. Japan simultaneously attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl
Harbor in Hawaii, thus ensuring American entry into the war.12
Until this point, the United States had not participated in the
strategic—as distinct from the commercial—pursuit of overseas oil,
as it possessed sufficient domestic reserves to satisfy its wartime
military requirements and those of its principal allies. As World War
II progressed, however, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his
senior advisers became worried that the heavy wartime extraction of
domestic oil was rapidly depleting U.S. reserves, thereby eroding
America’s capacity to sustain another full-scale war on the magnitude
of World War II.13 Accordingly, Roosevelt ordered the State and
Commerce Departments to seek a reliable foreign source of oil to

11 See generally JOHN KEAY, SOWING THE WIND: THE SEEDS OF
CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 124-29 (2003).
12 See THE PRIZE, supra note 8, at 328-67.
13 At this time, American geologists were unaware of major deposits in
Alaska and the deeper waters of the Gulf of Mexico, making it appear that U.S.
reserves were shrinking faster than later proved to be the case.
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supplement American reserves in the event of a major future
conflict.14
After considering the various possibilities, government
experts became convinced that Saudi Arabia constituted the best
candidate to serve in this capacity. Whereas most of the rest of the
Persian Gulf area was controlled by Great Britain, Saudi Arabia had
largely escaped British control. In addition, the Saudi monarch, King
Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, had granted a substantial concession to an
American oil firm, Standard Oil of California (Socal, later Chevron),
giving the United States a significant presence in the country. On
this basis, Roosevelt decided in 1943 to anoint Saudi Arabia as
America’s preferred foreign supplier of oil and to bring the Kingdom
under American military protection. Saudi Arabia was made eligible
for U.S. aid under the Lend-Lease Act and consideration was given to
the construction of a U.S. air base there. To bolster these efforts,
Roosevelt met with Abdul Aziz on February 14, 1945, and forged an
agreement with him under which the United States received
privileged access to Saudi oil in return for a United States pledge to
protect the monarchy against its assorted enemies.15
With the Roosevelt-Abdul Aziz agreement in place, the
United States began to insert a permanent military presence in the
Gulf region. This led, in 1946-47, to the establishment of an air base
at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia and a naval base at Bahrain.16 For the
most part, however, American policymakers relied on Great Britain
to maintain stability in the Gulf at this time. But, when London
announced that it would withdraw most British forces from “East of
Suez” by the end of 1971, Washington was forced to find another
friendly power to carry the burden of regional security. The United
See generally AARON DEAN MILLER, SEARCH FOR SECURITY 54–57, 62–
63, 74–77 (1980); DAVID S. PAINTER, OIL AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY 11–31,
34–35 (1986).
15 See generally MILLER, supra note 14, at 19–20, 49, 54–57, 62–63, 74–77,
128–31; PAINTER, supra note 14, at 32–95; MICHAEL B. STOFF, OIL, WAR AND
AMERICAN SECURITY 18–21, 35–39, 48–51, 57–88 (1980).
16 See generally DAVID E. LONG, THE UNITED STATES AND SAUDI
ARABIA: AMBIVALENT ALLIES (1985).
14
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States chose to rely on the Iranian regime of Shah Reza Mohammed
Pahlavi (whom the Americans and British had helped install as
absolute monarch through a CIA-orchestrated coup in 1954).17 From
1970 to 1979, the United States provided Iran with vast supplies of
modern arms, helping to transform the Iranian military into a potent
regional force.18 Not surprisingly, then, the fall of the Shah in
January 1979 produced great consternation in Washington, as there
was no obvious alternative to assume Iran’s role as a “surrogate
gendarme.” Eleven months later, Washington received another
shock when the Soviet Union commenced its invasion of
Afghanistan, putting Soviet troops within a few hundred miles of the
Persian Gulf and its vital energy supplies.
II. THE “CARTER DOCTRINE” AND BEYOND
The Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet takeover of
Afghanistan triggered a thorough review of U.S. policy toward the
Gulf. This review coincided with significant shifts in U.S. energy
trends. Until the early 1970s, the United States was largely able to
satisfy its petroleum requirements with crude from domestic reserves.
After 1972, however, domestic production went into decline and,
with consumption experiencing steady growth, the country was
forced to increase its reliance on imported oil. In 1970, imports
accounted for twenty-one percent of total U.S. oil consumption; by
1979, they accounted for forty-three percent of consumption.19 As
the United States was becoming more dependent on imports, the
major oil-producing countries were banding together to exact higher
prices for their products and, in some cases, to use their newfound
economic clout to extract political concessions from the major oil
consumers. This was especially evident in 1973-74, when members
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
17
18

See STEPHEN KINZER, ALL THE SHAH’S MEN (2003).
See MICHAEL T. KLARE, AMERICAN ARMS SUPERMARKET 127–26

(1984).
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2000 123, Table
5.1 (2001), http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/archive/038400.pdf.
19
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quadrupled the price of crude and the Arab OPEC members
imposed an embargo on sales to the United States, producing
widespread shortages and a global economic recession.20
With these developments in mind, then President Jimmy
Carter and his top advisers concluded that U.S. interests in the
Persian Gulf were too great to be entrusted into the hands of
surrogates and must instead come under the direct protection of
American forces. This proposition, ever since known as the “Carter
Doctrine,” was spelled out in the President’s State of the Union
address of January 23, 1980: “The region which is now threatened by
Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance.”21 By
occupying Afghanistan, President Carter explained that the Soviets
are “now attempting to consolidate a strategic position . . . that poses
a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.”22 Given the
importance of that oil to the United States and the world economy,
the United States had to be ready to take decisive action: “Let our
position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on
the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault
will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”23
Because the United States did not, at that time, possess any
forces earmarked specifically for operations in the Arabian Gulf area,
President Carter established a new military organization to implement
this policy: the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). He
also announced plans to deploy additional warships in the Gulf
proper and to acquire new bases in the surrounding region. These
measures received strong support from his successor, Ronald Reagan,

20
21

See THE PRIZE, supra note 8, at 588–632.
Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, (Jan. 23, 1980) (transcript

available at
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml).
22 Id.
23 Id.; see also MICHAEL A. PALMER, GUARDIANS OF THE GULF: A
HISTORY OF AMERICA’S EXPANDING ROLE IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1883–1992
101–11 (1999).
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who elevated the RDJTF into a full-scale regional combat
organization, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).24
President Reagan was also the first American leader to invoke
Carter’s pledge to use force when needed to safeguard the flow of oil.
When Iranian forces attacked Kuwaiti tankers during the Iran-Iraq
War of 1980-88, Reagan determined that such action constituted a
severe threat to the free flow of Persian Gulf oil and authorized the
“reflagging” of those tankers with the American ensign, thereby
allowing their protection by the U.S. Navy.25 On May 19, 1987,
President Reagan stated: “Mark this point well: The use of the sea
lanes of the Persian Gulf will not be dictated by the Iranians.”26 The
protection of Persian Gulf oil was also cited by Reagan’s successor,
President George H.W. Bush, as the justification for U.S. efforts to
protect Saudi Arabia following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on
August 2, 1990. “Our country now imports nearly half the oil it
consumes and could face a major threat to its economic
independence,” Bush declared on August 8th.27 Hence, “the
sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the
United States.”28
Today, the relationship between oil, security, and the Persian
Gulf remains as strong as ever. This is evident in the recurring
statements by American leaders that the United States will use force
if necessary to ensure the safe flow of Persian Gulf oil through the
Strait of Hormuz in response to any effort by Iran to impede such
shipping. While the Persian Gulf has remained the principal focus of
U.S. efforts to safeguard the global flow of oil, Washington has

24
25
26

PALMER, supra note 23, at 112–17.
Id. at 122–49.
Id. at 124 (quoting Ronald Reagan, Presidential Statement, (May 19,

1987)).
George H.W. Bush, Television Address, (Aug 8, 1990) (transcript
available at N.Y. TIMES, Aug 9, 1990).
28 Id.
27
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extended its protective shield to other oil-producing areas, especially
the Caspian Sea basin and West Africa.29
This drive to secure new sources of energy began under
President Clinton, who placed particular emphasis on the Caspian Sea
region. After the break-up of the Soviet Union and the emergence of
independent states in the Caspian basin, Clinton viewed this area as a
promising new source of energy as well as a strategic alternative to
reliance on the Persian Gulf. While eager to tap into the newlyaccessible oil and natural gas reserves of the Caspian area, Clinton
understood that any drive to direct Caspian Sea energy to the West
would require a substantial reorganization of the region’s energy
transportation system, as all existing export conduits dated from the
Soviet era and traveled through Russia before reaching Western
markets—a form of dependence on Moscow that Washington sought
to escape.30 To establish an alternative export route to the West,
Clinton lobbied for construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline, connecting Azerbaijan’s sector of the Caspian Sea to
Turkey’s Mediterranean coast via Georgia. Because this conduit
passed through or near several areas of ethnic unrest, including
Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, Clinton also
promised to bolster the military forces of the transit countries. In
this manner, the safe flow of Caspian oil to the West became a matter
of U.S. national security, as was the flow of Persian Gulf oil under
the Carter Doctrine.31
Just as President Clinton had extended the Carter Doctrine to
the Caspian Sea basin, President Bush extended it to West Africa.
Like the Caspian region, West Africa was said to be of strategic
importance to the United States both because of its prolific energy
supplies and as an alternative to reliance on the Middle East.32 As
29 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION:
FOREIGN OPERATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 2004 322-23 (Feb. 2003),
http://fas.org/asmp/resources/110th/CBJ08.pdf.
30 The Caspian Sea itself is land-bound, so any oil or natural gas exiting
the region for markets elsewhere must travel by pipeline or rail cars.
31 See generally BLOOD AND OIL, supra note 5, at 132–39.
32 See id. at 142–45.
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Assistant Secretary of State Walter Kansteiner observed in 2002,
“African oil is of national strategic interest to us, and it will increase
and become more important as we go forward.”33 On this basis, the
United States has provided favored African governments with
various forms of military assistance, just as it has those in the Caspian
Sea region.34 In further recognition of the area’s growing strategic
importance, President Bush established a new military organization
for the region, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Although
the establishment of AFRICOM was not explicitly tied to the
protection of oil—as was the case for CENTCOM—it is evident
from the historical record that concern over instability in the oilproducing areas of Africa was one of the motivating factors.35
III. THE END OF SCARCITY
Even today, the United States is pursuing a strategy driven in
large part by concern over the safety of foreign oil supplies. In the
Persian Gulf, U.S. forces are poised to counter any effort by Iran to
block oil shipping through the Strait of Hormuz; likewise, American
forces are involved in efforts to help protect oil pipelines in the
Caspian Sea basin and offshore oil platforms in the Gulf of Guinea.36
While the safety of foreign oil supplies remains a major responsibility
of the U.S. military, the economic and strategic underpinnings of
these activities have shifted. Because of a sudden and significant
increase in domestic energy production, the United States needs far
33 Mike Crawley, With Mideast Uncertainty, US Turns to Africa for Oil,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR,
May
23,
2002,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0523/p07s01-woaf.html.
34 Annual appropriations for military aid to Africa are tabulated in the
U.S. Department of State’s Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign
Operations, discussed in Michael Klare & Daniel Volman, The African ‘Oil Rush’ and
US National Security, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 609–28 (Aug. 22, 2006).
35 See LAUREN PLOCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34003, AFRICA
COMMAND: U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND THE ROLE OF THE U.S. MILITARY IN
AFRICA 15–16 (July 22, 2011), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf.
36 See, e.g., MICHAEL T. KLARE, RISING POWERS, SHRINKING PLANET
115–209 (2008).
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less imported oil than it did before; at the same time, U.S. oil
consumption has leveled off in response to the global economic
downturn and increases in the fuel efficiency of American vehicles.
In place of scarcity, pundits and policymakers are now speaking of
energy abundance as the determining factor in U.S. strategic planning.
“Instead of facing an Era of Scarcity,” observed Rex Tillerson, the
chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, “we are now witnessing the
transition to a new Era of Abundance.”37 This transition, he said in
2013, will “spur economic growth, create jobs, and strengthen energy
security.”38
The shift from scarcity to abundance has been both
extraordinary and unexpected. In 2005, when U.S. leaders were still
warning of increased dependence on unreliable foreign suppliers,
innovators in the oil and gas industry were already deploying new
technologies with explosive potential. These included, most of all,
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, or fracking—techniques
that permit the exploitation of previously inaccessible oil and natural
gas reserves in shale and other impermeable rock formations. Other
innovations allow for the extraction of oil and gas in Arctic and deepoffshore waters, and for the conversion of bitumen and other heavy
oils, such as Canadian tar sands (also called “oil sands”) into usable
products.39 Together, these technologies have allowed for a dramatic
turnaround in North American oil and gas output. Oil production in
the United States jumped from 7.6 million barrels per day in 2010 to
10.0 million barrels in 2013, an increase of thirty-two percent in just
three years. If current estimates by the Energy Information
Administration (EIA) prove accurate, domestic output will jump to
12.8 million barrels per day in 2020, the highest it has been since
1972.40 Natural gas production in the United States is also predicted
Rex Tillerson, Capitalizing on the Coming Era of Energy Abundance,
Address to Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, (Apr. 2, 2013) (transcript available
at
http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/company/news-andupdates/speeches/capitalizing-on-coming-era-of-energy-abundance).
38 Id.
39 See, e.g., MICHAEL LEVI, THE POWER SURGE: ENERGY, OPPORTUNITY,
AND THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE (2013).
40 See Table 1, infra.
37
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to see a sharp increase, with output climbing from 21.3 trillion cubic
feet in 2010 to an estimated 31.4 trillion in 2035.41 Canada,
meanwhile, is expected to see its oil output jump from 3.6 million
barrels per day in 2010 to 6.1 million barrels in 2035, with most of
this increase coming from Alberta’s tar sands.42
Not only is the United States enjoying an increase in domestic
energy output, but it is also using less oil. Total consumption
dropped from a high of 20.7 million barrels per day in 2007 to 18.6
million barrels in 2012, and is expected to remain at that level for the
indefinite future.43 When combined with rising domestic oil output,
this decline has resulted in a significantly reduced need for imported
oil. From a peak of 13.8 million barrels per day in 2007 (or sixtyseven percent of total U.S. consumption), U.S. oil imports fell to 8.9
million barrels in 2013 (forty-seven percent of consumption).
According to the most recent EIA projections, U.S. oil imports will
decline even further in the years ahead to 6.7 million barrels per day
in 2020 (thirty-four percent of consumption).44 Of this 6.7 million
barrels, moreover, approximately half is expected to come from
Canada (mostly in the form of diluted bitumen), reducing U.S.
reliance on imports from extra-hemispheric sources even further.
Although the United States and Canada are, at present, the
principal beneficiaries of the revolution in energy technology, they
are not expected to remain the sole proprietors of these new
techniques. Many other countries possess large deposits of shale oil
and gas and are beginning to employ hydraulic fracturing in a drive to
exploit these reserves. China and Russia, for example, have
announced ambitious plans to develop their extensive shale deposits,
as have Argentina, Poland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and South
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 WITH
PROJECTIONS
TO
2040
A-28,
Table
A14
(2014),
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383%282014%29.pdf.
42 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013
247,
Table
G1
(2013),
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/pdf/0484%282013%29.pdf.
43 Id. at 184, Table A5.
44 Id. at 247, Table G.
41
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Africa.45 Similarly, nations with significant offshore and Arctic
reserves, including Canada, China, Norway, Russia, and Vietnam,
have marshaled advanced technologies to develop these resources.
As a result, global supplies of oil and natural gas are expected to
remain relatively robust for years to come.46
As suggested by the IEA in its 2012 report, these
developments are bound to affect energy geopolitics in many ways.
Some of these effects are not likely to be evident for many years, but
some are already being felt. In particular, the new energy abundance
appears to be altering U.S. relations with the Persian Gulf, Russia,
and Europe. At the same time, new forms of energy-related
competition and conflict are emerging in other areas, including
Eurasia, the Arctic, and the deep oceans.
IV. AMERICA’S “ENDURING POSTURE” IN THE PERSIAN GULF
For some analysts, the natural response to diminished U.S.
reliance on Middle Eastern oil would be the withdrawal of American
forces from the Gulf and their deployment elsewhere to areas of
greater strategic significance. As paraphrased by The Economist, these
analysts argue that “if America can produce its own oil . . . why waste
so much blood and treasure policing the Middle East?”47 On the
surface, this outlook seems to make eminent sense, especially given
the high cost of maintaining a substantial military presence in the
Gulf at a time of diminished budget allocations. However, most
senior policymakers reject this option, saying the Gulf area remains
See Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment
of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States, ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (last updated June 13, 2013),
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/ (assessing global shale oil and
gas reserves); see INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra note 42, at 50-56
(discussing plans for the exploitation of shale gas reserves).
46 WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 1, at 81–154.
47 The
Petrostate of America, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2014,
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21596521-energy-boom-good-americaand-world-it-would-be-nice-if-barack-obama-helped.
45
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vital to U.S. security.48 Because the continued flow of Middle Eastern
oil is considered essential to world economic vigor—whether or not
that oil flows to U.S. markets—any significant U.S. military
withdrawal could lead to increased regional instability, disruptions in
the oil flow, and global economic chaos. As noted by Rex Tillerson
of Exxon, the uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf oil is essential “to
global economic stability,” and thus to U.S. security.49 Even if “we’re
no longer getting any oil from the Middle East because we’re secure
here,” he explained, “a disruption of oil supplies from that region will
have devastating impacts on global economies,” ours included.50
This logic appears to have persuaded President Obama, who
has pledged to retain a strong military presence in the Gulf. “The
United States of America is prepared to use all elements of our
power, including military force, to secure our core interests in the
region,” he told the U.N. General Assembly on September 24,
2013.51 “We will ensure the free flow of energy from the region to
the world.”52 Even though America is steadily reducing its
dependence on imported oil, he explained, “the world still depends
on the region’s energy supply, and a severe disruption could
destabilize the entire global economy.”53

See Thom Shanker & Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Planning Troop Buildup in
Gulf
after
Exit
from
Iraq,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
29,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/world/middleeast/united-states-planspost-iraq-troop-increase-in-persian-gulf.html?_r=1&.
49 Rex Tillerson, “The New North American Energy Paradigm,” Address
at the Council of Foreign Relations (June 27, 2012) (transcript available at
http://www.cfr.org/north-america/new-north-american-energy-paradigmreshaping-future/p28630).
50 Id.
51 President Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama in Address to
the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 24, 2013) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/24/remarks-presidentobama-address-united-nations-general-assembly) [hereinafter Obama to U.N.
General Assembly].
52 Id.
53 Id.
48
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Obama has also indicated that there will be a major shift in
U.S. strategy in the region. Instead of employing troops on the
ground to affect the outcome of regional power struggles as it has in
the past, the United States will rely on air and naval forces to ensure
the uninterrupted transportation of oil. This requires maintaining
sufficient forces in the area to prevent any attempt by Iran to block
the Strait of Hormuz, the crucial waterway connecting the Gulf to the
Indian Ocean. According to the New York Times, President Obama,
through intermediaries, has told Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, that closing the Strait of Hormuz is a “red line” that
would provoke an automatic U.S. military response.54 To ensure that
this is not an empty threat, Obama has ordered the Pentagon to
deploy sufficient air and naval strength in the area to overcome any
move by Iran to block the Strait. In the event Iran attempted such a
move, General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, said the United States will “take action and reopen the Strait.”55
It is evident, however, that U.S. policy extends beyond simply
keeping the Strait open. As suggested by Obama in his 2013 speech
to the United Nations, the United States intends to remain the
dominant military power in the region and exercise ultimate control
over the global flow of oil—and this, in fact, remains one of the
principal missions of the U.S. Central Command.56 “The U.S. fully
intends to maintain a strong and enduring military posture in the
[Gulf] region, one that can respond swiftly to crisis, deter aggression
and assure our allies,” declared CENTCOM commander General
Lloyd J. Austin III in his March 2014 testimony before Congress.57
This “enduring posture” is intended to overcome any threats to
Elisabeth Bumiller, Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S. Sends Top
Iranian Leader a Warning on Strait Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/13/world/middleeast/us-warns-top-iranleader-not-to-shut-strait-of-hormuz.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
55 Id.
56 Obama to U.N. General Assembly, supra note 51.
57 General Lloyd J.Austin III, Statement before the House Armed
Services
Committee
(Mar.
5,
2014)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.centcom.mil/en/about-centcom-en/commanders-posture-statementen).
54
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regional security and the safety of oil exports, but also to deter any
other power from assuming such a role.
This posture was on clear display in the spring of 2014, when
Islamic militants invaded Iraq from their strongholds in Syria and
captured Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. With these militants—
largely Sunnis under the banner of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS)—in control of major population centers and key energy
infrastructure, President Obama decided to send hundreds of U.S.
military advisers to Iraq to help the beleaguered forces of Prime
Minister Haider al-Abadi fend off the threat to Baghdad and Shiitepopulated areas in the south. “We will be helping Iraqis as they take
the fight to terrorists who threaten the Iraqi people, the region and
American interests as well,” Obama told reporters on June 19.58
How this initiative will evolve in the months ahead cannot be
foreseen, but it starkly testifies to Washington’s enduring interest in
the stability of the Persian Gulf area.
V. INCREASED UNITED STATES PRESSURE ON RUSSIA
If increased North American energy output has failed to
produce a dramatic shift in U.S. ties with the Persian Gulf area, it is
having a significant impact on U.S. relations with Europe and
Russia—particularly in response to the Ukraine crisis of 2013-14.
Even before Russia seized Crimea and began its meddling in eastern
Ukraine, U.S. pundits and policymakers were calling on the Obama
administration to facilitate the export of U.S. natural gas to Europe as
a way of reducing Europe’s reliance on Russian gas—and thus, it was
claimed, Europe’s excessive deference to Moscow’s political
preferences.59 Once the crisis broke out, these calls became even
58 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Situation in
Iraq (June 19, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/06/19/remarks-president-situation-iraq).
59 See Coral Davenport & Steven Erlanger, U.S. Hopes Boom in Natural Gas
Can
Curb
Putin,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
5,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/world/europe/us-seeks-to-reduceukraines-reliance-on-russia-for-natural-gas.html.
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more strident, with Republicans in Congress introducing legislation
to eliminate regulatory barriers to such exports.
At present, Europe relies on natural gas for about one-fourth
of its total energy consumption, with about thirty percent of that gas
coming from Russia. Europe’s dependence on Russian gas is a
product of several factors, including proximity, prolific Russian gas
deposits, limited European reserves, and an elaborate system of
pipelines connecting Russian fields to European markets.60 To
further cement these ties, Gazprom—the Russian state-controlled gas
behemoth—has established partnerships with many of the leading
European gas-distribution companies, including Eni of Italy and
E.ON of Germany.61 Ukraine occupies a particularly significant role
in this elaborate system, as more than half of all the gas supplied to
Europe by Russia in 2013 was carried through pipelines crossing that
country.62
Because so much of Europe’s gas is obtained from pipelines
that pass through Ukraine, European consumers have periodically
suffered from shortages resulting from Moscow’s efforts to
intimidate Ukrainian officials by halting or reducing the inflow of gas
into those conduits, usually during negotiations over the price
Ukraine pays for its imports of Russian gas. Initially, when Ukraine
first separated from the former Soviet Union in 1991, Gazprom
provided it with gas at a discounted rate compared to what the same
gas sold for in Western Europe. As Ukraine moved closer to the
West, however, Moscow raised the price it charged Ukraine for gas.
When Ukrainian officials refused to pay the higher amount, Moscow
cut off supplies—thereby reducing or eliminating the flow to

60 See generally Russia, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 26, 2013),
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Russia/russia.pdf;
see
also
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra note 42, at 45, 51, 58.
61 See 16% of Natural Gas Consumed in Europe Flows through Ukraine,
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Mar.
14,
2014),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15411.
62 Id.
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European recipients further along the pipelines’ path.63 In response,
individual European countries and the European Union have
adopted a series of measures intended to reduce their reliance on
Russian gas and/or their exposure to political strife in Ukraine.
These have included the construction of Nordstream, a RussianGerman pipeline that bypasses Ukraine, and plans for additional
pipelines that rely on non-Russian sources in the Middle East and
Africa.64
American officials have long urged Europeans to further
reduce their dependence on Russian natural gas, saying such reliance
undermines Euro-Atlantic solidarity and, accordingly, NATO’s ability
to confront Moscow in a crisis. In particular, Washington has sought
to persuade European leaders to accelerate the construction of
pipelines that would bypass Russia and to increase their reliance on
imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which can be shipped from
numerous suppliers, including the United States. The Obama
administration has also encouraged Europeans to develop their
domestic reserves of shale gas, further diminishing their reliance on
Russian supplies.65
Not surprisingly, these efforts received a substantial boost
when the Ukraine crisis erupted in the fall of 2013. This crisis had
many roots, including anger over widespread governmental
corruption and a desire on the part of many Ukrainians to reduce
their economic ties to Moscow, but also revolved to a considerable
degree around energy issues. As part of the “association agreement”
Kiev was planning to sign with the European Union prior to the
onset of the crisis, Ukraine’s energy systems would come under
See DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE
REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 239–41 (2011).
64 Id. at 241-43; see also EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMMUNICATION FROM
THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL:
EUROPEAN
ENERGY
SECURITY
STRATEGY
(May
28,
2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/20140528_energy_security_communication.pdf.
65 See Conal Walsh, Gas on High Heat as Western Power Takes on Russia’s
Energy
Giant,
GUARDIAN,
July
8,
2006,
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2006/jul/09/russia.g8.
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European Union rules and regulations on competition and
transparency,66 thereby precluding secret deals of the sort previously
concluded between Ukraine’s natural gas oligarchs and their
counterparts in Russia. Under pressure from Russian President
Vladimir Putin, the Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych,
scrapped the European Union deal and opted instead for closer ties
with Moscow—thereby triggering the mass protests that eventually
led to his flight and the establishment of a new government in Kiev.67
Russia, fearing the loss of its influence in the region and key strategic
assets, seized Crimea and instigated an anti-government insurgency in
eastern Ukraine. Although driven in part by nationalistic impulses,
Putin’s seizure of Crimea gave Russia control over a significant swath
of the Black Sea thought to house substantial reserves of oil and
natural gas.68
To discourage further adventurism by Moscow, the United
States has imposed tough sanctions on key members of Putin’s inner
circle and warned of further such measures if Moscow does not
exercise restraint. Recognizing that U.S. efforts alone are insufficient
to deter Moscow, American leaders have also sought to stiffen
Europe’s resistance to Russian provocations by helping to reduce its
reliance on Russian natural gas.69 As suggested by House Speaker
John A. Boehner, European reliance on Russian energy “has
diplomatic repercussions, making them more reluctant to challenge
some of Mr. Putin’s arrogant actions.” The answer to this dilemma,

EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION, EU-UKRAINE ASSOCIATION
AGREEMENT
–
THE
COMPLETE
TEXTS,
http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/assoagreement/assoagreement-2013_en.htm.
67 See
Ukraine Crisis Timeline, BBC NEWS, July 5, 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.
68 See William J. Broad, In Taking Crimea, Putin Gains a Sea of Fuel Reserves,
N.Y.
TIMES,
May
17,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/europe/in-taking-crimea-putingains-a-sea-of-fuel-reserves.html.
69 See Davenport & Erlanger, supra note 59.
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he suggested, is to provide Europe with gas from America’s “vast
supplies of natural energy.”70
Before the United States can act on this strategy, however,
the White House must facilitate the construction of new facilities for
converting domestic gas supplies into LNG, thereby enabling its
shipment to Europe by sea. At present, only one such facility, at
Sabine Pass, Louisiana, has received the necessary permits and is
actually under construction. Plans for another half-dozen such
facilities have received preliminary clearance and are expected to
proceed into development, but will not commence operations for
several years; applications for another twenty-four LNG terminals are
under evaluation by the Department of Energy.71 Part of the holdup
is existing U.S. legislation, which requires a comprehensive
assessment of each facility’s contribution to the national interest. In
response to the Russian intervention in Ukraine, however, American
politicians are calling for the adoption of new rules allowing a more
rapid approval process.
In March, Boehner declared that
“[e]xpediting approval of natural gas exports is one clear step the U.S.
can take to stand by our allies and stand up to Russian aggression.”72
Although calls for quicker approval of LNG export facilities
enjoy strong support in Washington and are likely to result in new
rules and regulations, some analysts question whether such actions
will have any significant impact on Putin’s strategic calculations. For
one thing, the earliest U.S. shipments of LNG to Europe will not
occur until late 2015 or early 2016, by which time the political
situation in Ukraine will, presumably, be resolved. Furthermore, the
John Boehner, Counter Putin by Liberating U.S. Natural Gas, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 6, 2014,
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023038242045794210241725
46260.
71 See Project Sponsors Are Seeking Federal Approval to Export Domestic Natural
Gas,
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(Apr.
24,
2012)
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=5970.
72 Boehner: Stand Up to Putin by Ending De Facto Ban on U.S. Natural Gas
Exports, press release, Speaker Beohner’s Press Office (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/boehner-stand-putin-ending-de-facto-banus-natural-gas-exports.
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added cost of liquefying the gas, shipping it across the Atlantic, and
turning it back into gas at the other end will make U.S. gas as
expensive as Russian gas, eliminating some of the incentive to switch.
On top of this, LNG prices in Asia are significantly higher than those
in Europe, so future U.S. exports are likely to cross the Pacific, not
the Atlantic.73
Despite these doubts, U.S. leaders are likely to continue
advocating the shipment of U.S. gas to Europe as a way of exploiting
growing U.S. energy abundance for political advantage. “Moscow is
not immune from pressure,” former Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice wrote in March.74 The Putin regime relies on oil and gas exports
for its economic survival, she noted. But soon, “North America’s
bounty of oil and gas will swamp Moscow’s capacity,” deterring
Russian adventurism.75
VI. NEW SITES OF CONTENTION
The introduction of new modes of extraction is altering the
global geopolitical equation in other significant ways. Among many
noteworthy effects, new modes of extraction enable the exploitation
of once-inaccessible oil and gas reserves in the Arctic and the deep
oceans. In some cases, however, the ownership of these reserves is
in dispute, as they lie in areas with unresolved boundaries. This is
producing new sources of friction and conflict, as nations fight for
control over these promising resources.

See, e.g., Stephen Munson, Can U.S. Natural Gas Rescue Ukraine from
Russia?
WASH.
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Mar.
25,
2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/03/25/can-u-snatural-gas-rescue-ukraine-from-russia/.
74 Condolezza Rice, Will America Heed the Wake-Up Call of Ukraine?,
WASH.
POST,
Mar.
7,
2014,
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Energy companies have, of course, long drilled for oil and
natural gas in shallow coastal areas adjacent to their onshore deposits,
for example, in waters of the Gulf of Mexico off Louisiana and in the
Caspian Sea off Baku in what is now Azerbaijan. The development
of deepwater drilling, however, is a relatively recent phenomenon. In
2005, Chevron set a record by drilling in 3,500 feet of water in the
Gulf of Mexico, a major site for deepwater innovation. Just one year
later, Chevron doubled that depth at its Jack No. 2 well at another
Gulf location.76 Shell was the next to break records, announcing in
2010 that it had drilled 8,000 feet beneath sea level at its Perdido
field, 200 miles east of the Texas coastline.77 Brazilians are also
beginning to reach extreme depths in their efforts to exploit newly
discovered undersea reservoirs in the South Atlantic, called “pre-salt”
fields because they lie below a thick layer of salt.78 Record-breaking
depths have also been reached in waters off India and Angola.
The introduction of deep-sea drilling technologies is expected
to result in a substantial increase in hydrocarbon output from
offshore fields. “In deepwater around the world, our industry’s
technologies will allow production to more than double over the next
30 years,” Exxon’s Tillerson affirmed in 2013.79 At the same time,
however, the onset of drilling in some offshore areas is generating
new sources of conflict, as countries fight over the possession of
undersea reserves in disputed maritime areas. While some offshore
fields lie in areas that are under the undisputed jurisdiction of
adjacent countries, such as Shell’s and Chevron’s operations in the
U.S. portion of the Gulf of Mexico, others lie in areas that are
disputed by two or more countries, as is the case of promising
reserves in the East and South China Seas.80

See, e.g., Michael T. Klare, THE RACE FOR WHAT’S LEFT 41–49 (2012).
Id.
78 For more information on Brazil’s “pre-salt” development plans, see
Brazil,
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INFO.
ADMIN.
(Oct.
1,
2013),
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=BR.
79 Tillerson, supra note 37.
80 For background on this issue, see THE RACE FOR WHAT’S LEFT, supra
note 76, at 63; Tillerson, supra note 37.
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The East and South China Seas are semi-enclosed extensions
of the western Pacific Ocean that harbor a number of small
uninhabited islands and are bordered by China and a number of
other states: the East China Sea by Japan and Taiwan; the South
China Sea by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and
Vietnam.81 In both cases, the bordering countries have laid claim to
significant swaths of these waters, citing historical ownership of
assorted islands as well as development rights provided under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The
UNCLOS treaty, first approved in 1982, grants signatory powers an
“exclusive economic zone” (EEZ) extending up to 200 nautical miles
from their coastline. In the case of continental states, such as China,
the UNCLOS treaty also allows them to exploit their outer
continental shelf, even if it extends beyond 200 miles. Given the
relatively small size of these two seas, this has led to a welter of
overlapping claims to the waters involved, with China claiming the
lion’s share of both areas and the other states contending with both
China and their immediate neighbors.82 To demonstrate their resolve
to protect their claims, most of these countries have deployed naval
or coast guard vessels in their respective EEZs. On some occasions,
this has resulted in maritime clashes between the contending forces.83
Energy analysts are divided over the energy potential of the
East and South China Seas, but both are believed to harbor
significant reserves of oil and natural gas. According to the EIA, the
81 On disputes in the East China Sea, see East China Sea, ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN.
(Sept.
25,
2012),
http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics.cfm?fips=ECS; for more information on disputes in the South China Sea,
see South China Sea, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/South_China_Sea/south_china_sea.
pdf.
82 See id.; see also U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994), part
V,
arts.
55–60,
available
at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOSTOC.htm.
83 For a timeline of these clashes, see Timeline: Disputes in the South China
Sea, WASH. POST, June 8, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/world/special/south-china-sea-timeline/.
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East China Sea holds between 60 and 100 million barrels of oil and
between 1 and 2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Chinese experts,
however, see a much larger potential: as much as 70 to 160 billion
barrels of oil and 250 to 300 trillion cubic feet of gas.84 A similar
mismatch prevails in estimates of reserves in the South China Sea: the
EIA sees only 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of
gas, while Chinese experts see as much as 125 billion barrels of oil
and up to 500 trillion cubic feet of gas.85 Very little systematic testing
has been conducted in these areas, so it is impossible to verify these
estimates. Nevertheless, it is evident that both bodies of water
possess oil and gas reserves on a scale sufficient to attract the interest
of all surrounding countries.
Until now, most of the drilling in the East and South China
Seas has occurred at sites in the undisputed EEZs of one or another
of the states involved. Recently, however, China has begun drilling in
parts of the South China Sea claimed by Vietnam, provoking naval
clashes and anti-Chinese riots in Vietnamese cities. The most serious
episode erupted in May 2014, when the China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC) deployed its largest deepwater drilling rig, the
HD-981, in waters off the northern coast of Vietnam.86 Once
emplaced in the drilling area, the Chinese surrounded the HD-981
with a large flotilla of naval and coast guard ships; and when
Vietnamese coast guard vessels attempted to penetrate this defensive
ring in an effort to drive off the rig, they were rammed by Chinese
ships and pummeled by water cannon. No lives were lost in those

East China Sea, supra note 81.
South China Sea, supra note 81.
86 See Jane Perlez & Keith Bradsher, In High Seas, China Moves Unilaterally,
N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/10/world/asia/inhigh-seas-china-moves-unilaterally.html?_r=0; Keith Bradsher, China and Vietnam at
Impasse Over Rig in South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/world/asia/china-and-vietnam-at-impasseover-drilling-rig-in-south-china-sea.html.
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encounters, but anti-Chinese rioting in Vietnam proper led to several
deaths and scores of injuries.87
As noted in most press accounts of these events, the naval
clashes and rioting sparked by the deployment of HD-981 in
Vietnamese-claimed waters were driven in large part by nationalism
and resentment over past humiliations. The Chinese, insisting that
the islands in the South China Sea were once ruled by China, are
seeking to overcome the territorial losses they suffered under the
sway of the Western imperial powers and Imperial Japan. Similarly,
the Vietnamese, long accustomed to Chinese invasions, seek to
protect what they view as their sovereign territory. Despite the sociopolitical implications, the energy dimensions of the conflict should
not be minimized. Both China and Vietnam are determined to
exploit the oil and gas reserves of the South China Sea, and neither
shows any inclination to compromise on their respective claims.88
The same can be said of the Philippines with respect to its swath of
that sea, and of Japan with respect to contested areas of the East
China Sea. So long as these bodies of water are viewed as a valuable
source of energy, the parties to these disputes are likely to persist in
their efforts to exploit what they view as their rightful resources—
even if this means risking armed conflict with their neighbors.

87 See Chris Buckley, Chau Doan & Thomas Fuller, China Targeted by
Vietnamese
in
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Riots,
N.Y.
TIMES,
May
14,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/world/asia/foreign-factories-in-vietnamweigh-damage-in-anti-china-riots.html; Jane Perlez, Vietnam Issues Stern Warning on
Protest Violence Amid Standoff with China, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2014, at A10; Jane
Perlez, China and Vietnam Point Fingers After Clash in South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/world/asia/vietnam.html?gwh=831C4FA
C884E04DEB4AA14093F61C971&gwt=pay&assetType=nyt_now.
88 See, e.g., Stirring Up the South China Sea, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Apr. 23,
2012),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/223stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-i.aspx.
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VII. THE MILITARIZATION OF THE ARCTIC
The development of new drilling technologies is also leading
to increased oil and gas drilling in the Arctic region—and here, too,
disputes have arisen over the ownership of valuable reserves.
The Arctic region, encompassing the northern reaches of
Alaska, Canada, Norway, and Russia, plus the Arctic Ocean itself,
occupies only six percent of the Earth’s surface yet is believed to
house approximately thirty percent of the world’s undiscovered
natural gas and thirteen percent of its undiscovered oil.89 Until
recently, the Arctic’s harsh weather conditions and year-round ice
cover made it highly unattractive as a site for oil and gas drilling;
however, as a result of climate change and the introduction of icehardened drilling rigs, energy companies are finding it easier to
operate in the region. With sea ice now vastly reduced in summer
months, the drilling season has been extended and drilling platforms
can operate further north. To take advantage of these conditions, oil
companies are stepping up their efforts to exploit the Arctic’s energy
resources.90 Royal Dutch Shell, for example, is attempting to drill in
areas of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas off Alaska, while Statoil is
extracting gas from Norway’s sector of the Barents Sea, and
Gazprom is preparing to drill in the Pechora Sea off northern Siberia.
Many other such endeavors, including a collaborative effort between
Exxon and Rosneft to exploit oil reserves in the Kara Sea, are likely
to get under way in the years ahead.91

89 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCUM-ARCTIC RESOURCE APPRAISAL:
ESTIMATED OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS NORTH OF THE ARCTIC CIRCLE
(2008), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf.
90 See, e.g., RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41153,
CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (Aug. 4,
2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf; see also Philip Budzik, Arctic Oil
and Natural Gas Potential, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. OFFICE OF INTEGRATED
ANALYSIS
AND
FORECASTING
(Oct.
2009),
http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/arctic/pdf/arctic_oil.pdf.
91 For background on these endeavors, see THE RACE FOR WHAT’S LEFT,
supra note 76, at 70–93; see also Clifford Krauss, Exxon and Russia’s Oil Company in
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Apr.
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Although promising as a fresh source of energy, the
development of the Arctic’s oil and gas reserves is likely to spark new
geopolitical tensions. This is due to the region’s immense resource
potential and the fact that disputes have arisen over the location of
offshore boundaries in the Arctic Ocean—and thus over the
ownership of certain promising energy reserves. The United States,
for example, has a boundary dispute with Russia in the Bering Sea
and with Canada in the Beaufort Sea; Canada has a dispute of its own
with Greenland over their mutual boundary; and Greenland has one
with Iceland.92 All of these countries, moreover, are vying for control
over the outer Arctic, beyond their respective 200-nautical-mile
EEZs. These disputes would not provoke much concern in the
absence of major energy deposits, but take on increased significance
when the countries involved hope to procure significant economic
benefits from the disputed areas. As noted by Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel in November 2013, “a flood of interest in energy
exploration [in the Arctic] has the potential to heighten tensions over
other issues.”93
The risk of tension and conflict in the Arctic is further
exacerbated by the determination of key regional policymakers to rely
on military power to reinforce their claims to contested territories.
Although the Arctic states have pledged to refrain from the use of
force in asserting their claims, most have taken steps to enhance their
capacity to engage in combat operations in the area.94 Russia, for
example, has announced plans to establish new bases in the Arctic
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/business/energy-environment/exxon-andrussian-oil-company-agree-to-jointprojects.html?_r=1&&gwh=D4243D6AF66DF59057355FEED9D935F8&gwt=pa
y.
92 For background on Arctic boundary disputes, see Reginald R. Smith,
The Arctic: A New Partnership Paradigm of the Next “Cold War”? 63 JOINT FORCES
Q.,117–24 (2011); see also Changes in the Arctic, supra note 90, at 15–16.
93 Chuck Hagel, Speech at the Halifax International Security Forum
(Nov.
22,
2013)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1821).
94 See, e.g., Heather Conley & Jamie Kraut, U.S. Strategic Interests in the
Arctic: An Assessment of the Current Challenges and New Opportunities for Cooperation, CTR.
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (Apr. 2010); Smith, supra note 92, at 124.
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and to deploy specially equipped combat forces there. This buildup,
said President Putin, “will make it possible to substantially strengthen
our military and border security and also to increase the effectiveness
of the protection of natural resources.”95 Canada has also taken steps
to bolster its presence in the Arctic, establishing a new base at
Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island and ordering a new fleet of icehardened patrol ships.96 Norway, which shares a border with Russia
in its far north, has relocated its combined military headquarters to
Boda, above the Arctic Circle, and has taken other steps to bolster its
Arctic combat capabilities.97
The potential for friction and conflict arising from the
contention over prime Arctic real estate is further exacerbated by the
lack of a clear legal regime and adjudicative system for the resolution
of Arctic boundary disputes.
UNCLOS provides conflicting
guidance on the determination of offshore territories, awarding
coastal states a 200-mile EEZ but also allowing them to claim control
over their outer continental shelf, even if it extends beyond 200
nautical miles. The Convention also provides for the adjudication of
offshore boundary disputes by the newly-established International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, but few states have been willing to
bring their disputes to this body, which only examines cases brought
on a voluntary basis.98 The only other international organization with
jurisdiction in the region, the Arctic Council, is not empowered to
address territorial disputes.99 It is likely, then, that these disputes will
95 Jacob Kipp, Russian Strategic Interests Expand in the Arctic, 8 EURASIA
DAILY
MONITOR
173
(Sept.
21,
2011),
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38430&no_cach
e=1#.VNfS5HacMU1; for background on Russian military initiatives in the Arctic,
see Conley and Kraut, supra note 94, at 23–25.
96 See Conley and Kraut, supra note 94, at 17–18.
97 Id. at 21–23.
98 See generally RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42784,
MARITIME TERRITORIAL AND EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ) DISPUTES
INVOLVING
CHINA:
ISSUES
FOR
CONGRESS
(Aug.
5,
2014),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf; see also International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, The Tribunal, https://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=15&L=0.
99 See
Arctic
Council,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE,
http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/ac/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
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continue to fester as the drive to exploit the Arctic’s energy riches
gains momentum.
VIII. THE ROAD AHEAD
As this brief survey suggests, the geopolitics of energy was
long governed by expectations of scarcity—the presumption that oil
and natural gas reserves are limited in extent, and that, as global
demand increased, the competition for what remained would become
increasingly intense and fractious. In fact, significant shortages and
supply disruptions have occurred in past decades, lending credibility
to this presumption. However, earlier predictions that the world of
2014 would be facing a downward curve in the global supply of
hydrocarbons have been replaced by expectations of energy
abundance, stretching out for decades to come. Indeed, many
analysts now suggest that the global demand for fossil fuels like oil
and natural gas will begin to contract long before supplies disappear,
as countries around the world institute measures to reduce emissions
of climate-altering greenhouse gases.100 Under these circumstances,
we might reasonably expect a dramatic shift in the character of
energy geopolitics, with considerably less emphasis on the use of
force to secure overseas sources of supply. Yet, while there has been
some alteration in the global policy landscape, conflict over energy
continues to convulse international affairs.
Several factors can be identified to explain the persistence of
energy competition and conflict. To begin with, the expectations of
abundance expressed in the United States, Canada, and some other
countries are not shared by all major energy consumers. The leaders
of China and Japan, for example, continue to worry about their
ability to procure sufficient oil and gas supplies from foreign
suppliers to meet their long-term requirements. And while the new
100 See Brad Plumer, Is Peak Oil Demand Just Around the Corner? WASH.
POST
WONKBLOG,
Aug.
9,
2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/09/is-peak-oildemand-just-around-the-corner/.
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extractive technologies are expected to permit the exploitation of vast
hydrocarbon reserves in such locales as Argentina, Brazil, China,
Russia, and Saudi Arabia, it is still not known whether they will
perform as well in these places as they have in the United States and
Canada.101 Under these circumstances, many countries will continue
to view energy through the lens of potential scarcity, as they have in
the past.
Even if oil and natural gas prove to be more abundant than
originally assumed, these products continue to be viewed as vital
materials whose possession, in adequate amounts, is essential for the
well-being and security of the nation. As noted by Robert E. Ebel of
the Center for Strategic and International Studies in a 2002 address at
the State Department, “[o]il fuels much more than automobiles and
airplanes.
Oil fuels military power, national treasuries, and
international politics.”102
Far more than an ordinary trade
commodity, “it is a determinant of well-being, of national security,
and international power for those who possess this vital resource and
the converse for those who do not.”103 This assessment has
governed international policymaking for over a century, and while the
widespread introduction of renewable energy may, in time, render it
moot, it will continue to shape the foreign and security policies of
nation-states for some time to come.
The struggle for control over key deposits of energy has been
a significant source of conflict in the past, and is likely to remain so
for some time into the future. The nature, locale, and dynamics of
such conflict may well experience change in the years ahead, but the
underlying motive—to ensure adequate supplies to satisfy critical
national requirements—will not.

101

See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra note 42, at 51–

55.

Robert E. Ebel, Geopolitics of Energy Into the 21st Century, Remarks to the
Open Forum, U.S. Dep’t of State (Apr. 30, 2002) (transcript available at
http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/of/proc/tr/10187.htm).
103 Id.
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Table 1: U.S. Oil Production, Consumption, and Imports, Actual
2005-2013 and Projected 2015-2040 (in million barrels per day)

2005
Actual (A)
2010 A
2013 A*
2015
Projected
(P)
2020 P
2025 P
2030 P
2035 P
2040 P

Oil
Consumption

Oil
Production

Oil
Imports

20.8

6.9

13.9

Imports as %
of
consumption
66.8

19.1
18.9
19.1

7.6
10.0
12.2

11.6
8.9
6.9

60.5
47.0
36.1

19.5
19.2
18.7
18.6
18.6

12.8
12.1
11.5
11.6
11.7

6.7
6.9
7.2
7.0
6.9

34.4
35.9
38.5
37.6
37.1

Source for Actual data: BP, STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD
ENERGY JUNE 2013 8, 9 (2013),
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statisticalreview/statistic
al_review_of_world_energy_2013.pdf.
Source for Projected data: ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013, supra note 42, at Tables A5, G1.
Source for 2013: Petroleum and Other Liquids Supply and
Disposition,
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(2013),
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_sum_snd_d_nus_mbblpd_a_cur.
htm.
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